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BIEN VENUE: SEC V. JOHNSON AND THE POLICY 
FOR BROAD PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN 
PUBLIC SECURITIES ACTIONS 
KELLY KYLIS+ 
A phone rings in Washington, D.C.  The caller is a corporate representative, 
located in Los Angeles, California, requesting a business meeting in Dallas, 
Texas.  The meeting takes place in Dallas, where individuals from the 
corporation’s offices in Washington, D.C., California, Texas, Arizona, and 
Massachusetts offices gather to discuss the corporation’s annual earnings 
report.  One attendee returns to the D.C. office and files the annual report with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  That report is fraudulent and, 
upon a government investigation, the SEC files a lawsuit.  Where can all the 
co-conspirators be sued for their fraudulent actions? 
In the modern global economy, business arrangements and transactions 
involve numerous individuals located in many different places.1  Although 
globalization benefits businesses, it complicates legal disputes.  For instance, if 
parties to a securities transaction jointly engage in fraud, but share no ties to 
any single jurisdiction, where should a plaintiff bring suit against them?  
Judicial efficiency calls for one lawsuit against all potential defendants,2 but 
the requirements for establishing venue against multiple defendants are fairly 
strict under the general federal venue statute.3  Courts have interpreted section 
27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to allow for an act 
by one defendant in a securities fraud scheme to establish venue against all 
defendants.4  Both private plaintiffs and the SEC have used this interpretation 
                                                 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., 2009, University of Maryland.  The author wishes to thank Professor Megan La Belle for 
her exceptional guidance and unwavering support throughout the writing process and beyond.  
The author also wishes to thank her family, friends, Catholic University Law Review staff 
members, and the Salty Dog for all of their encouragement and assistance throughout law school 
and the publication of this pursuit of proper venue. 
 1. See 5 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON 
SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD, § 10:18 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that securities 
transactions frequently involve individuals located in many places). 
 2. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1318 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that an 
inconvenience to one defendant is less prejudicial than litigating the same cases several times). 
 3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012); see also BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, 
supra note 1, § 10:18 (recognizing that the general venue statute’s requirements are increasingly 
burdensome in the modern world of globalized corporate transactions). 
 4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).  A 
discussion of the concern among scholars and practitioners about whom to sue for violations of 
the securities laws is beyond the scope of this Note.  For more information, see 10b-5 Claim for 
Securities Fraud: Whom to Sue?, WALL ST. L. BLOG (July 17, 2011), 
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of section 27, known as the “co-conspirator theory of venue,” in civil securities 
enforcement actions.5 
Venue is the geographic location in which a case should be heard based on 
the rules of convenience for the parties.6  In securities fraud cases, venue is 
proper (1) in any jurisdiction where an “act or transaction constituting the 
violation occurred;” or (2) where the defendant resides or does business.7  Only 
one act in a jurisdiction by a defendant is sufficient to establish venue under 
the securities laws.8  Under the co-conspirator theory of venue, in a suit 
involving multiple defendants, an act by one defendant in a jurisdiction will 
deem that jurisdiction as a proper venue as to all other co-defendants who 
participated in the fraudulent scheme.9  In effect, the co-conspirator theory of 
venue provides plaintiffs with great latitude to choose venue.10 
In SEC v. Johnson, the SEC filed a civil enforcement action under section 
10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act against six participants in an alleged 
securities fraud scheme in Washington, D.C.11  One defendant, Christopher 
Benyo, argued that venue was improper as to him because he did not engage in 
any actions in Washington, D.C.12  The United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia held that venue was proper under the co-conspirator 
                                                                                                                 
http://wallstreetlaw.typepad.com/sherman/2011/07/in-the-landmark-central-bank-of-denver-case 
-the-us-supreme-court-ruled-that-there-is-no-private-right-of-action-available-ag.html. 
 5. See, e.g., Vigman, 764 F.2d at 1317–18 (citing Stewart v. Fry, 575 F. Supp. 753, 755 
(E.D. Mo. 1983)); DeMoss v. First Artists Prod. Co. Ltd., 571 F. Supp. 409, 411–12 (N.D. Ohio 
1983); Hill v. Turner, 492 F. Supp 61, 62–64 (M.D. Pa. 1980); SEC v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 
465 F. Supp. 104, 111 (D.D.C. 1979); Warren v. Bokum Res. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 1360, 1363–65 
(D.N.M. 1977); Bertozzi v. King Louie Int’l, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1166, 1169–71 (D.R.I. 1976); 
Arpet, Ltd. v. Homas, 390 F. Supp. 908, 911–12 (W.D. Pa. 1975); SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. 
Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 291–94 (D.D.C. 1973). 
 6. 28 U.S.C.A § 1391; see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, et al., FED. PRAC. & PROC. 
JURISDICTION § 3801 (3d ed. 2011) (“‘Venue’ refers to locality, the place where a lawsuit should 
be heard according to the applicable statutes or rules.” (footnote omitted)). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2010) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 8. See RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Geller, No. 3199CV2401 (JCH), 2000 WL 306997, at *3 (D. 
Conn. Jan. 10, 2000) (citing Wharton v. Roth, 263 F. Supp. 922, 923 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (“A single 
act or transaction is sufficient to render venue appropriate.”). 
 9. Diversified Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. at 111 (“The co-conspirator venue theory, in 
essence, provides: ‘any allegation of a securities act violation is sufficient for venue purposes 
even as to a defendant who did not commit an act within the district if that defendant is in league 
with a defendant who did act within the district.’” (quoting Levin v. Great W. Sugar Co., 274 F. 
Supp. 974, 978 (D.N.J. 1967)). 
 10. See Ravenwoods Inv. Co., v. Bishop Capital Corp., No. 04CV926GKMK, 2005 WL 
236440, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2005) (citing In re AES Corp. Sec. Lit., 240 F. Supp. 2d 557, 
559–62 (E.D. Va. 2003)); see also 6 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION, § 17.3 at 395–96 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the broad venue 
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 11. 650 F.3d 710, 712–13 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 956 (2011). 
 12. Id. at 713. 
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theory of venue.13  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the co-conspirator theory 
was inapplicable and venue was improper as to Benyo.14 
This   Note   argues   that   the   D.C.   Circuit   erred   when   it   rejected  
the co-conspirator theory of venue.  Part I of this Note discusses venue in 
federal courts and the special venue provision of the Exchange Act.  By 
analyzing the language and purpose of the Exchange Act, this Note shows that 
the co-conspirator theory of venue, as used by the SEC in public enforcement 
actions, is consistent with the language and spirit of securities law.  Next, this 
Note discusses the prior case law upholding the co-conspirator theory of venue 
and illustrates how the D.C. Circuit Court erred in SEC v. Johnson.   Finally, 
this Note concludes by suggesting a congressional amendment to the Exchange 
Act to include the co-conspirator theory of venue. 
I.  VENUE: THE RULES OF CONVENIENCE 
A.  Venue in Federal Courts, Generally 
At common law, venue was controlled by the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, which allowed a court to decline to hear a case, even if it had legal 
authority to hear it, when the interests of justice were better served by allowing 
another forum to hear the case.15  The U.S. Supreme Court has outlined several 
factors to help courts determine whether the interests of justice weigh in favor 
of hearing the case in that venue, including access to sources of proof, 
availability and cost of compulsory process for witnesses, possibility of view 
of premises, easy, expeditious and inexpensive trial, and public interest.16  
                                                 
 13. SEC v. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 2d 82, 93 (D.D.C. 2008) (reasoning that the defendant 
“aided and abetted a scheme, a material part of which occurred in the District of Columbia”), 
rev’d, 650 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 956 (2011). 
 14. Johnson, 650 F.3d at 715–16 (finding that the “SEC failed to lay venue in the District of 
Columbia”). 
 15. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (noting that “the principle of 
forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when 
jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute”), superseded by statute, Pub. L. 
104-317, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006), as recognized in Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 
443, 449 n.2 (1994); see also Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. 
REV. 908, 909 (1947) (discussing the origins of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which is 
believed to have come to the United States from Scotland). 
 16. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508 (“It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an 
inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or 
trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy.  But unless the balance is strongly in 
favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”).  Later cases 
have referred to this balancing test as the “Gilbert Analysis.”  See, e.g., Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 
454 U.S. 235, 244 (1981); see also Braucher, supra note 15, at 930 (noting that “the principal 
characteristic of [the doctrine of forum non conveniens] is its absurd complexity”).  The 
complexity of this doctrine led Congress to enact 28 U.S.C. § 1404, which provides for a venue 
transfer for the convenience of the parties and witnesses.  See David E. Steinberg, The Motion to 
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Given the difficulty in balancing these factors, Congress defined venue for 
federal courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1391.17  Section 1391(b) states that: 
A civil action may be brought in—(1) a judicial district in which any 
defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which 
the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part 
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a 
substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; 
or 
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought 
as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any 
defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect 
to such action.18 
Although venue is proper anywhere personal jurisdiction exists, venue is 
distinct from personal jurisdiction19 and determined after personal jurisdiction 
has been established.20  However, similar to personal jurisdiction, a defendant 
may waive venue by not objecting to it at the outset of litigation.21 
A defendant has recourse if the plaintiff’s choice of forum is unduly 
burdensome.22  Defendants may either challenge venue as improper, under 28 
U.S.C. § 1406,23 or inconvenient, under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).24  If venue is 
                                                                                                                 
Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 450–52 (1990) (discussing 
the development of § 1404). 
 17. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012). 
 18. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b). 
 19. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) (citing WRIGHT, supra note 
6, at § 3801) (defining personal jurisdiction as “the court’s power to exercise control over the 
parties”); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing United States ex 
rel. Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1969))  (“The concepts of personal jurisdiction and 
venue are closely related but nonetheless distinct.”); E. Lawrence Vincent, Defining ‘Doing 
Business’ to Determine Corporate Venue, 65 TEX. L. REV. 153, 154 (1986) (discussing the 
different functions served by venue and personal jurisdiction). 
 20. Leroy, 443 U.S. at 180 (noting that personal jurisdiction is generally decided before 
venue). 
 21. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960) (acknowledging that venue is waived if an 
objection is not raised); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 635, 639, 
(1945) (asserting that “venue may be lost unless seasonably asserted”). 
 22. 28 U.S.C.A § 1404(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2006).  In Leroy, 
the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that the venue statute provided protection to the defendant in 
addition  to  the  protection  provided  by  the  personal  jurisdiction  doctrine.   Leroy,  443  U.S. 
at 183–84; see Mitchell G. Page, After the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Does the General 
Federal Venue Statute Survive as a Protection for Defendants?, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1153, 1161 
(2003) (discussing venue as an additional protection for defendants); see also WRIGHT, supra 
note 6, § 3801 (“[T]he laws relating to venue give added protection to defendants beyond those 
that are provided by the statutory and constitutional prerequisites of personal jurisdiction.”). 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (stating that a court cannot hear a case if venue is improper and 
must either dismiss it or transfer it to a proper forum). 
 24. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (giving courts latitude to transfer a case “in the interest of 
justice”). 
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improper under §1406, a judge must either dismiss or transfer the case to a 
proper forum.25  By contrast, challenging venue under §1404 provides the 
defendant the option to seek a transfer for the convenience of the parties or 
witnesses, which the court has discretion to grant.26  Because a plaintiff’s 
choice of venue is given substantial weight, a defendant who objects to venue 
on the basis of convenience bears the difficult burden of showing that the 
interests of convenience and justice substantially outweigh the plaintiff’s 
choice of venue.27  
 In addition to the general federal venue statute, Congress has enacted 
“special” venue provisions that are applied in particular cases.28  Specific 
provisions in the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Exchange Act 
govern venue for disputes arising under the securities laws.29  These provisions 
are considered “other law” under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and therefore these 
provisions, not the §1391 general venue statute, govern venue for all cases 
brought under the securities laws.30 
                                                 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (requiring dismissal or transfer for improper venue). 
 26. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (providing that a court may transfer an action to another forum). 
 27. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a); see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947) 
(discussing the balancing test that is used to decide whether a case should be transferred for the 
convenience of the parties and witnesses).  To determine whether to transfer for forum non 
conveniens, the court weighs factors such as: availability of proof, compulsory process and jury 
view of the premises, practical problems of inexpensive and expeditious trial, public interest 
considerations, and the interest of the plaintiff in his choice of forum.  Id.; see also David E. 
Pearson, Transfer of Venue Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a): All Things to All People, or, Cracking 
Under the Weight of the Forum Selection Clause, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 925, 952 (2002) (discussing 
the difficulty in achieving a transfer under § 1404(a) and its similarity to the forum non 
conveniens analysis); Steinberg, supra note 16, at 509 (discussing the development of the motion 
to transfer venue, concluding that the law “is in chaos” and that, although “Congress intended 
section 1404 to promote convenient and efficient litigation, the current multifactor balancing 
approach insures that transfer litigation will be neither quick nor inexpensive”). 
 28. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957) (declining 
to apply the general venue statute to a patent infringement case because a special venue provision 
was applicable); Zorn v. Anderson, 263 F. Supp. 745, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (applying the specific 
venue provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, to a securities law case).  A special venue provision also exists 
for litigation under antitrust laws.  PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: 
PROCEDURAL LAW 201 (1983). 
 29. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (Supp. IV 2010); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Supp. IV 2010). 
 30. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) (providing that “except otherwise 
provided by law” the venue provision of §1391 applies to federal cases) (emphasis added); see 
Rhett Traband, The Case Against Applying the Co-Conspiracy Venue Theory in Private Securities 
Actions, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 227, 231–32 (1999) (citing Zorn, 263 F. Supp. at 747) (noting the 
difference between the general and specific venue statutes in the United States Code and 
discussing the application of the specific venue statutes in the Securities Act and the Exchange 
Act). 
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B.  The Special Venue Provisions Under the Securities Acts 
The Securities Act and the Exchange Act’s special venue provisions provide 
plaintiffs with a broad choice of forum in securities fraud actions.31  However, 
when plaintiffs bring an action under both the Securities Act and the Exchange 
Act, the venue provision of the Exchange Act will apply to the whole action.32 
1.  The Securities Act and the Exchange Act 
In order to fully analyze secondary liability under the special venue 
provisions, it is important to first understand the intended purpose of both the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act.  Under the Securities Act,33 any 
company wishing to issue securities must register with the SEC and disclose 
“material facts” that a reasonable investor would want to know, such as 
financial information about the company.34  If a company fails to adhere to 
these requirements, it may be subject to criminal prosecution initiated by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) or a civil enforcement action by the SEC.35 
                                                 
 31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa; see Ravenwoods Inv. Co. v. Bishop Capital Corp., No. 
04CV9266KMK, 2005 WL 236440, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2005) (noting that 15 U.S.C. § 78aa 
“afford[s] broad venue options to securities fraud plaintiffs”). 
 32. The venue provision of the Exchange Act is broader than the venue provision of the 
Securities Act.  See Allen v. Byrne, No. 3:07-cv-060109, 2008 WL 763066, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 
2008) (citing Hilgeman v. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am., 547 F.2d 298, 301 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977)); Ingram 
Indus., Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683, 687 (E.D. Ky. 1981). 
 33. Congress enacted the Securities Act in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 to 
accomplish two primary goals: (1) require public disclosure and (2) prohibit fraud in the sale of 
securities.  See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last modified Aug. 30, 2012); see also Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1–5 (1933)) 
(“The Securities Act of 1933 . . . was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of 
material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors 
against fraud and . . . promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing.”). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 77q provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . by the use of 
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or 
by use of the mails, directly or indirectly (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading; or (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 
15 U.S.C. § 77q (2006); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITES LAW 35–36 (2d 
2003) (“Rule 405 defines ‘material’ as ‘matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security 
registered.’”). 
 35. HAZEN, supra note 34, at 11 (stating that violations of the law are subject to both civil 
and criminal consequences). 
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The Exchange Act established the SEC and governs trading securities in 
secondary markets.36  The SEC is authorized to bring both administrative and 
civil enforcement actions against corporations.37  Among other things, the SEC 
enforces section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, known as the general anti-fraud 
provision, which prohibits manipulative or deceptive practices in securities 
transactions.38 
2.  Secondary Liability and Central Bank of Denver 
Although the Securities Act and the Exchange Act do not expressly include 
liability for secondary acts, courts previously had found secondary liability for 
persons who indirectly assist in the commission of securities fraud in all 
cases.39  Despite the overwhelming acceptance of a private cause of action for 
aiding and abetting securities fraud by federal courts,40 in Central Bank of 
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, the Supreme Court rejected such 
secondary liability under section 10(b).41  In Central Bank of Denver, 
                                                 
 36. The Securities Act of 1933, 25 U.S.C. §§ 77 et seq.  See also HAZEN, supra note 34, at 3 
(“The 1934 Act regulates all aspects of public trading of securities.”); see also The Investor’s 
Advocate: How the S.E.C. Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital 
Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#create (last modified Nov. 12, 2012) 
[hereinafter The Investor’s Advocate] (“The Act empowers the SEC with broad authority over all 
aspects of the securities industry. This includes the power to register, regulate, and oversee 
brokerage firms, transfer agents, and clearing agencies as well as the nation’s securities self 
regulatory organizations (SROs).”).  The SEC is an independent agency, and is often considered 
“a true superagency” because it “exercises most administrative powers, with one exception: It 
cannot adjudicate disputes between private parties.”  HAZEN, supra note 34, at 3.  The SEC was 
formed to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
formation.”  The Investor’s Advocate, supra, at 1.  
 37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 78(u), 78u-2 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); see SEC Enforcement Actions, 
17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2011); see also HAZEN, supra note 34, at 17 (“The SEC has direct 
prosecutorial authority to enforce the 1934 Act in court with civil suits for injunctions and 
ancillary relief against alleged violators.  Should a criminal violation exist, the SEC Division of 
Enforcement refers it to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.”). 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (2006); Barbara J. Finnegan, To Catch a Thief: The 
Misappropriation Theory and Securities Fraud, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 692, 695 (1987) (noting that 
10(b) is “a general fraud provision” that has provided the SEC with “general regulatory powers 
over securities transactions”). 
 39. See David J. Baum, The Aftermath of Central Bank of Denver: Private Aiding and 
Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 44 AM. U. L REV. 1817, 1819–20 (1995).  
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. was the first time a court held, using the 
common law of torts, that a defendant was liable for aiding and abetting under section 10(b); see 
also Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681–81 (N.D. Ind. 1966), 
aff’d, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969); Carrie E. Goodwin, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank: Not 
Just  the  End  of  Aiding  and  Abetting  Under  Section  10(b),  52  WASH.  &  LEE  L.  REV. 
1387, 1393–94 (1995) (discussing the evolution of aiding and abetting liability in securities fraud 
cases). 
 40. Goodwin, supra note 39, at 1395. 
 41. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 192 (1994), 
superseded by statute, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
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bondholders sued Central Bank, the trustee for the bonds, for aiding and 
abetting fraud after the bond issuer defaulted on the bonds.42  The Supreme 
Court held that because the securities statute did not expressly provide for 
secondary liability, nor prohibit aiding and abetting, the plaintiffs could not 
maintain their action against Central Bank.43 
Central Bank of Denver’s limitation could have been far-reaching.44  In 
order to avoid such a result, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which, among other things, expanded the 
SEC’s authority to include enforcement of aiding and abetting liability.45 
                                                                                                                 
737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)), as recognized in Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC 
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 522 U.S. 148, 162 (2008). 
 42. Id. at 167–68.  The Court described the facts surrounding Central Bank’s alleged 
participation in the fraud that gave rise to plaintiff’s claim for aiding and abetting as: 
In January 1988, [Central Bank was provided] with an updated appraisal of the land 
securing the 1986 bonds and of the land proposed to secure the 1988 bonds . . . . Soon 
afterwards, Central Bank received a letter from the senior underwriter for the 1986 
bonds.  Noting that property values were declining . . . the underwriter expressed 
concern . . . .  [Central Bank’s] in-house appraiser decided that the values listed in the 
appraisal appeared optimistic . . . [,and he] suggested that Central Bank retain an 
outside appraiser to conduct an independent review of the 1988 appraisal . . . . Central 
Bank agreed to delay independent review of the appraisal until the end of the year, six 
months after the June 1988 closing on the bond issue.  Before the independent review 
was complete, however, the [bond issuer] defaulted on the 1988 bonds. 
Id. 
 43. Id. at 191–92 (“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we 
hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).”).  
However, the Court permitted liability for secondary actors if the elements to establish primary 
liability were met.  Id.  Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver left 
unanswered the question of whether to apply primary liability to secondary actors in securities 
fraud cases.  See Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibited by Section 10(b) 
and the Elements of Rule 10b-5: Reflection on Securities Fraud and Secondary Actors, 53 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 667, 668–70 (2004) (discussing the various tests applied by lower courts and the SEC 
to avoid Central Bank of Denver’s holding). 
 44. Baum, supra note 39, at 1838 (noting that the Central Bank of Denver decision 
“eliminated a powerful weapon” to reach individuals like lawyers and accountants who were not 
directly involved in the securities fraud, but provided some degree of assistance). 
 45. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737,  
§ 104 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)).  Several members of Congress have also argued, to 
no avail, for a private cause of action for aiding and abetting.  See 155 CONG. REC. 8,564 (2009) 
(declining to provide for a private action for aiding and abetting securities fraud); Jim Hamilton, 
Specter Amendment Having Last Hurrah, JIM HAMILTON’S WORLD OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
(June 22, 2010), http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2010/06/specter-amendment-having-last-hu 
rrah.html (discussing the proposed amendment to include a private right of action for aiding and 
abetting, introduced by Senator Specter); see also GAO, Securities Fraud Liability of Secondary 
Actors, GAO-11-664, at 3–6, 30–46 (2011) [hereinafter Securities Fraud Liability] (reporting on 
the state of securities litigation involving secondary actors and discussing the arguments for and 
against imposing a private cause of action for secondary liability); Melissa C. Nunziato, Aiding 
and Abetting, a Madoff Family Affair: Why Secondary Actors Should Be Held Accountable for 
Securities Fraud Through the Restoration of the Private Right of Action for Aiding and Abetting 
Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 73 ALB. L. REV. 603, 605 (2010) (using the Bernie 
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3.  Venue Provisions Under the Securities Laws 
Section 22(a) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. § 77v) and section 27 of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78aa) provide that venue is proper (1) in the district 
where any act or transaction constituting a violation occurred; or (2) in the 
district where the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, or transacts business.46  
These venue provisions provide plaintiffs broad choice and “home field 
advantage,” thus fulfilling the statutory purpose of the securities acts.47  The 
language of the venue provision of the Exchange Act is “manifestly broad,” 
and therefore courts have “[a]ppropriately . . . construed the provision broadly, 
holding that the ‘venue-sustaining act need not constitute the core of the 
alleged violation, nor even be illegal, so long as it represents more than an 
immaterial part of the alleged violations.’”48  One common example of an act 
that is sufficient to satisfy venue requirements is the filing of misleading or 
fraudulent documents.49  Courts have stated that, as a matter of law, venue is 
proper in Washington, D.C., when fraudulent documents are filed with the 
                                                                                                                 
Madoff Ponzi scheme to argue that Congress should pass legislation allowing a private right of 
action for secondary liability).  Note, however, that the DOJ has authority to bring a criminal 
action against aiders and abettors.  18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006).  Additionally, states can, and have, 
enacted their own securities statutes to include private liability for aiding and abetting liability.  
See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 1260 Before the 
Subcomm. On Securities, S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 47 
(1997) (prepared statement of Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman, & Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Commissioner, 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission); Securities Fraud Liability, supra, at 3 (“[M]any 
states’ ‘blue sky laws’ impose express private liability for secondary actors.”).  Further, some 
scholars argue that regulation by the states is a more efficient and successful way to protect 
investors from securities fraud.  See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE 
FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 43 (2002). 
 46. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (Supp. IV 2010); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Supp. IV 2010). 
 47. See Clapp v. Stearns & Co., 229 F. Supp. 305, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (stating that the 
Exchange Act includes a “policy to provide a forum for suits involving multi-state frauds, no 
matter how many states the defendants are citizens”).  Opponents of the co-conspirator theory 
argue that the “home field advantage” is unwarranted, and that the theory makes securities laws 
too “plaintiff-friendly.”  See Traband, supra note 30, at 228 (arguing that “[t]he co-conspiracy 
venue theory prejudices defendants, because it: (a) bases a decision on venue on the pleadings 
and affidavits which must be construed in a plaintiff’s favor and improperly advances discovery 
at an early stage in the case; (b) eliminates the foreseeability and knowledge components of venue 
and creates an inability to predict where suit can be brought; (c) generally affects ancillary 
defendants; and (d) enables individual plaintiffs to sue under favorable state securities laws”). 
 48. In re AES Corp. Sec. Litig., 240 F. Supp. 2d 557, 559 (E.D. Va. 2003) (quoting S-G 
Sec., Inc. v. Funqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (D. Mass. 1978)). 
 49. See e.g., SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that 
the defendant must concede that venue is proper because the case is governed by §78aa); RMS 
Titanic, Inc. v. Geller, No. 3199CV2401 (JCH), 2000 WL 306997, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2000) 
(stating that the act establishing venue “need not be illegal so long as it is material”); Bolton v. 
Gramlich, 540 F. Supp. 822, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing Hilgeman v. Nat’l Ins. Co., 547 F.2d 
298, 301 (5th Cir. 1977)); Ingram Indust., Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683, 689 (E.D. Ky. 
1981). 
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SEC because the filing constitutes an act sufficient to establish venue in the 
District.50 
C.  Co-Conspirator Theory of Venue: Bringing Down All Scheming Defendants 
Together 
The co-conspirator theory of venue affords plaintiffs great latitude in 
choosing the forum for a lawsuit against all defendants.51  For years, plaintiffs 
(including the SEC) have relied on the co-conspirator theory of venue to sue all 
parties in a securities fraud scheme in one forum.52  The co-conspirator theory 
of venue provides that “[a]ny allegation of a securities act violation is 
sufficient for venue purposes even as to a defendant who did not commit an act 
within [a certain] district if that defendant is in league with a defendant who 
did act within [that] . . . district.”53  However, the co-conspirator venue theory 
requires an action by at least one defendant that is sufficient to establish venue 
in order to extend venue to the co-conspirators.54 
                                                 
 50. See John Nuveen & Co. v. N.Y.C. Hous. Dev. Corp., Nos. 86C2583, 86C2817, 1986 
WL 5780, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 1986) (“Venue will be sustained in a securities case where a 
defendant causes false or misleading information to be transmitted into a judicial district, even if 
the defendant never has been physically present in that district.” (quoting Oxford First Corp. v. 
PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 197 (E.D. Pa. 1974))); see also Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 
F.2d at 1154; In re AES Corp. Sec. Litig., 240 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (stating that “the case law 
uniformly supports the proposition that the alleged transmission of the misleading materials into 
the district is a venue-sustaining act under § 78aa”). 
 51. See Traband, supra note 30, at 266–67 (“Because the co-conspiracy venue theory 
permits plaintiffs to choose from a much broader choice of venue, it enables plaintiffs to pick and 
choose which state’s securities law claims they wish to pursue.   The co-conspiracy venue theory 
thus greatly enhances forum shopping.”).  This is in-line with the generally broad language of the 
venue provisions governing securities law, which are preferential to the plaintiff’s choice of 
venue.  See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on 
Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 271 (1995) (providing examples of factors that aid a plaintiff 
in choosing venue). 
 52. See HAZEN, supra note 10, at 396–97 (“In multi-defendant and multi-forum securities 
fraud actions . . . any act committed, material to and in furtherance of an alleged fraudulent 
scheme by any defendant, will satisfy the 1934 Act venue requirement as to all defendants.”). 
 53. SEC v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104, 111 (D.D.C. 1979) (quoting Levin v. 
Great W. Sugar Co., 274 F. Supp. 974, 978 (D.N.J. 1967)). 
 54. See FS Photo, Inc. v. PictureVision, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 442, 446 (D. Del. 1999) (citing 
Southmark Prime Plus, L.P. v. Falzone, 768 F. Supp. 487, 489 (D. Del. 1991)) (stating that “the 
co-conspirator venue theory only applies where venue has been established over one conspirator 
by reason of an act or transaction performed in the district by that conspirator in furtherance of 
the conspiracy,” and, therefore, holding that venue in Delaware was improper when it could not 
be established that any defendant committed an act in Delaware). 
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1.  Acceptance of the Co-Conspirator Theory Across Jurisdictions 
The earliest courts to apply the co-conspirator theory were federal district 
courts in Delaware, New York, and New Jersey.55  In 1955, a federal district 
court in New York held that venue was proper in New York for a non-New 
Yorker based on his participation in the securities fraud scheme, even though 
he had never visited New York.56  Likewise, in 1980, a federal district court in 
Pennsylvania explicitly adopted the theory, noting that it was “widely 
accepted” and consistent with the language of § 78aa.57  By the early 1980s, it 
became clear that courts around the country had embraced the theory in 
securities fraud cases.58 
Currently, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuits, as well as federal district courts around the country, 
endorse the co-conspirator theory of venue.59  These courts recognize that the 
theory accomplishes the purpose of the securities laws and the broad purpose 
of venue generally.60  The D.C. Circuit in Johnson became the first court to  
 
                                                 
 55. Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416, 429 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (discussing the 
development of the co-conspirator theory of venue); Traband, supra note 30, at 243–44 (citing 
Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466, 469–70 (D. Del. 1962) and Townsend Corp. 
of America v. Davidson, 222 F. Supp. 1, 2–3 (D.N.J. 1963) as two of the earliest cases to apply 
the co-conspirator theory in securities actions). 
 56. Thiele, 131 F. Supp. at 420 n.4 (holding that “[a]part from the conspiracy allegation, his 
actions would not be sufficient”). 
 57. Hill v. Turner, 492 F. Supp. 61, 63–64 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (citing Hilgeman v. Nat’l Ins. 
Co. of Am., 547 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1977)) (adopting the co-conspirator theory of venue 
because “the ‘co-conspiracy’ theory of extended venue is widely accepted . . . [and because] the 
principle coincides well with the language and judicial interpretation of [section 78aa]”); see also 
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 758–59 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 
398 F.2d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1968); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter, 371 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir. 
1967). 
 58. See, e.g., Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(citing Stewart v. Fry, 575 F. Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Mo. 1983)); DeMoss v. First Artists Prod. 
Co., 571 F. Supp. 409, 411–12 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Hill, 492 F. Supp. at 63–64; SEC v. Diversified 
Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104, 111 (D.D.C. 1979); Warren v. Bokum Res. Corp., 433 F.  Supp  
1360,   1364   (D.N.M.  1977);   Bertozzi   v.   King   Louie   Int’l,   Inc.,   420   F.   Supp.   1116, 
1170–71 (D.R.I. 1976); Arpet v. Homas, 390 F. Supp. 908, 911 (W.D. Pa. 1975); SEC v. Nat’l 
Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 291–92 (D.D.C. 1973); Levin v. Great W. Sugar Co., 274 
F. Supp. 974, 977–78 (D.N.J. 1967); Zorn v. Anderson, 263 F. Supp. 745, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)). 
 59. See Vigman, 764 F.2d at 1316–18; Hilgeman, 547 F.2d at 301–02; Bath Indus., Inc. v. 
Bolt, 427 F.2d 97, 114 (7th Cir. 1970); Wyndham Assocs., 398 F.2d at 620.  If these Circuits 
continue to apply the co-conspirator theory of venue, a circuit split may arise.  See CAHILL, 
GORDON, REINDELL, LLP, D.C. Circuit Rejects “Co-Conspirator Theory of Venue” in Securities 
Litigation (July 5, 2011), http://www.cahill.com/news/memoranda/1012913/_res/id=sa_File1/C 
GR%20Memo%20%20D.C.%20Circuit%20Rejects%20’CoConspirator%20Theory%20of%20Ve
nue’%20In%20Securities%20Litigation.pdf. 
 60. See, e.g., Vigman, 764 F.2d at 1316–18 (recognizing the “strong policy favoring the 
litigation of related claims in the same forum”); In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 338 F. Supp 438, 
440 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (stating that it may be impossible “to accomplish [the] purpose [of the 
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reject this theory of venue.61 
2.  Prior Application of the Co-Conspirator Theory of Venue in Washington, 
D.C. 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, similar to other federal 
district courts, has a longstanding history of consistently applying the co-
conspirator theory of venue in securities fraud cases.62  For example, in SEC v. 
National Student Marketing Corp., the D.C. district court noted that “it is well 
recognized that in multi-defendant and multi-forum securities fraud actions, 
any act committed material to and in furtherance of an alleged fraudulent 
scheme will satisfy the venue requirement of the Exchange Act as to all 
defendants wherever the defendants are found.”63  Further, in Jarmuth v. 
Turetsky, the D.C. district court emphasized that securities fraud cases are the 
only type of cases to which a “conspiratorial theory of venue in civil cases” 
applies.64  Despite the D.C. district court’s adjudication of many co-conspirator 
cases brought by the SEC, Johnson is the first time that the D.C. Circuit has 
addressed this issue. 
                                                                                                                 
Exchange Act] if, when a complex scheme is alleged involving defendants from many states, 
venue for a particular district would have to be established as to each alleged participant in the 
illegal plan by proving that his illegal acts in furtherance of the fraud were committed in that 
district”). 
 61. The co-conspirator theory of venue has not applied only in those cases where the 
requirements for the use of the theory are not met.  See, e.g., FS Photo, Inc. v. PictureVision, Inc., 
48 F. Supp. 2d 442, 446 (D. Del. 1999) (holding that it was not established that any of the 
defendants performed an act or transaction in furtherance of the conspiracy alleged in Delaware; 
therefore, the co-conspirator theory did not apply). 
 62. See, e.g., Schreiber v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 382 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D.D.C 1974) 
(applying the co-conspirator theory of venue in a securities fraud litigation); SEC v. Nat’l Student 
Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 292 (D.D.C. 1973) (acknowledging that the co-conspirator theory 
applies for securities fraud involving multi-defendants and several forums). 
 63. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. at 292. 
 64. 815  F.  Supp.  4,  6  (D.D.C.  1993)  (citing  CHARLES  ALAN  WRIGHT,  supra  note  6,  
§ 3807 (2d ed. 1986)) (“There seems to be general acceptance of this theory in civil cases 
involving securities laws . . . .”).  The co-conspirator theory of venue has been much more widely 
accepted in securities fraud cases than any other specialized venue provisions.  Traband, supra 
note 30, at 250–51; see HAZEN, supra note 10, at 395–96 (discussing how the co-conspirator 
theory been so widely accepted as in securities law).  For example, after Bankers Life & Casualty 
Co. v. Holland, in which the Supreme Court rejected the use of the co-conspirator theory of venue 
in an antitrust case, multiple courts held that the co-conspirator theory is no longer accepted in 
antitrust cases.  See Bankers Life & Cas. Co v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953); Traband, 
supra note 30, at 250 (citing Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 492 
(9th Cir. 1979)); see also In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 283–84 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(noting that antitrust plaintiffs have no “statutory right” to try all antitrust co-conspirators in the 
same district); San Antonio Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 499 F.2d 349, 351 n.3 (5th Cir. 1974); H.L. Moore 
Drug Exch., Inc. v. Smith, Kline & French Labs, 384 F.2d 97, 98 (2d Cir. 1967). 
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II.  SEC V. JOHNSON: THE LAST APPEARANCE OF THE CO-CONSPIRATOR 
THEORY OF VENUE UNDER § 78AA? 
A.  Defendant Benyo’s Venue Objection 
In January 2005, the SEC filed a civil enforcement action against 
Christopher Benyo and six other defendants in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia.65  Two of the defendants were America Online (AOL) 
executives and four, including Benyo, were employees of PurchasePro, a 
company that made software for online “business-to-business” sales.66  The 
alleged scheme for which the SEC brought action was based on “sham 
transactions” executed by PurchasePro on a series of sales made for the 
purpose of inflating the company’s revenue.67  To effectuate the scheme, AOL 
referred third-parties to purchase PurchasePro software licenses, but AOL and 
PurchasePro financed those third-party licenses in accordance with a side 
agreement.68  This undisclosed side agreement made each transaction appear to 
generate revenue for PurchasePro.69  The SEC filed an enforcement action for 
violations under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, including a count of aiding 
and abetting securities fraud against Benyo.70 
Benyo, a resident of Nevada, argued that venue was improper in 
Washington, D.C., because he did not engage in any actions in the District to 
establish venue there.71  The district court agreed with the SEC’s application of 
the co-conspirator theory of venue and held that venue was proper as to 
Benyo.72  The district court subsequently found Benyo liable for aiding and 
abetting securities fraud.73  Benyo appealed to the D.C. Circuit, arguing that 
                                                 
 65. SEC v. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d, 650 F.3d 710, 713 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 956 (2011).  The SEC brought the action on the same day that 
the Department of Justice filed a criminal action in the Eastern District of Virginia against the 
same defendants for the same securities fraud.  Johnson, 650 F.3d at 713.  Defendant Benyo was 
acquitted of the charges against him in the criminal action.  Id. 
 66. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 84. 
 67. Johnson, 650 F.3d at 712. 
 68. Id. (revealing that PurchasePro did not report these side agreements resulting in inflated 
revenue for PurchasePro). 
 69. Id. (noting that these “sham transactions” appeared “on paper to generate a substantial 
amount of revenue for PurchasePro”). When the fraud was uncovered by PurchasePro auditors 
and attorneys, PurchasePro excluded the fraudulent revenue from its SEC report and reported 
only $16 million in revenue, about half of the $30 million in revenue it had publicly reported just 
a month earlier.  Id. 
 70. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 84–85. 
 71. Johnson, 650 F.3d at 713 (noting that Benyo filed an answer, a motion for summary 
judgment, and a motion for judgment as a matter of law, all arguing that his alleged fraudulent 
actions occurred in Nevada, not Washington, D.C.). 
 72. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 93 (holding that “[b]ecause Benyo aided and abetted a 
scheme, a material part of which occurred in the District of Columbia, venue . . . is proper in this 
District”). 
 73. Id. (holding that Benyo violated 15 U.S.C. § 78(t)(e) (2006)). 
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the district court erred in applying the co-conspirator theory of venue because 
the theory did not exist under section 10(b) of the securities laws.74 
B.  The D.C. Circuit’s Fatal Blow 
The D.C. Circuit began its opinion by flatly rejecting the co-conspirator 
theory of venue, stating that “the co-conspirator theory of venue is but a gloss 
upon and an extension of § 78aa.”75  The court relied on two Supreme Court 
cases as grounds for its rejection: Central Bank of Denver v. First Bank of 
Denver and Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland.76  In Central Bank of 
Denver, the Supreme Court held that there was no private cause of action for 
aiding and abetting under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.77  The D.C. 
Circuit held that the co-conspirator theory of venue was inconsistent with  
§ 78aa on the basis that if there is no action for secondary liability post Central 
Bank,78 venue cannot be based on a claim of secondary liability.79  The D.C. 
Circuit further noted that all of the circuit courts that had previously accepted 
the co-conspirator theory of venue “pre-date Central Bank of Denver.”80 
Next, the D.C. Circuit noted that in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 
the Supreme Court rejected the use of the co-conspirator theory of venue in 
antitrust cases.81  Although some circuits, even after Bankers Life, applied the 
co-conspirator theory of venue in securities enforcement actions for policy 
reasons,82 the D.C. Circuit found that “[p]olicy considerations cannot override 
our interpretation of the text and structure of the [Exchange] Act.”83  
                                                 
 74. Corrected Brief of Appellant Benyo at 43, Johnson, 650 F.3d 710 (No. 09-5399); see 15 
U.S.C. § 78(j) (2006); Johnson, 650 F.3d at 714 (“[T]he question . . . is whether the extension [of 
§ 78aa by the co-conspirator theory of venue] is consistent with the terms of § 78aa.”). 
 75. Johnson, 650 F.3d at 714. 
 76. Id. at 714–16 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 
164, 192 (1994), superseded by statute, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)), as recognized in Stoneridge 
Inv.  Partners,  LLC  v.  Scientific-Atlanta,  Inc.,  522  U.S.  148,  162  (2008); and Bankers Life 
& Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953)). 
 77. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191. 
 78. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 79. Johnson, 650 F.3d at 714–15. 
 80. Id. (citing Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1985); 
Hilgeman v. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am., 547 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1977); Wyndham Assocs. v. 
Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1968)) (questioning whether Central Bank of Denver 
precludes reliance on earlier decisions). 
 81. Id. at 715 (citing Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 384) (noting that this, “as a practical matter, 
was the end of the co-conspirator theory of venue in antitrust”). 
 82. Id. (noting that the Second and Ninth Circuits permit the theory for securities fraud 
cases based upon “‘strong policy favoring the litigation of related claims in the same forum’” 
(quoting Vigman, 764 F.2d at 1318)). 
 83. Id. (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188) (citing Leroy v. Great W. United 
Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 181–82, 182–83 n.14 (1979); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 
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Therefore, the court concluded that despite long-term use of the co-conspirator 
theory by many circuits,84 the “so-called theory” was inconsistent with the 
“straightforward language” of the venue provision of the Exchange Act.85  
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court and dismissed the case 
without prejudice.86 
III.  THE D.C. CIRCUIT ERRED IN REJECTING THE CO-CONSPIRATOR THEORY 
OF VENUE IN SEC V. JOHNSON 
A.  Important Distinctions the D.C. Circuit Failed to Recognize 
In Johnson, the D.C. Circuit primarily relied on Central Bank of Denver v. 
First Bank of Denver and Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland to conclude 
that  the  co-conspirator  theory  of  venue  was  inconsistent  with  15  U.S.C. 
§ 78aa.87  However, the facts of Central Bank of Denver and Bankers Life are 
distinguishable from Johnson such that these cases are not applicable in the 
way the court relies on them.88 
1.  Central Bank of Denver 
Central Bank of Denver is not controlling for two reasons.  First, unlike 
Johnson, Central Bank of Denver involved a private plaintiff, the First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, who alleged secondary liability against Central 
Bank under section 10(b) for aiding and abetting.89  Although private actions 
have been viewed as a “necessary supplement” to the SEC’s enforcement 
                                                                                                                 
148, 156 n.12 (1976)).  The Supreme Court had also expressly rejected using any policy 
considerations when interpreting section 78aa.  See Leroy, 443 U.S. at 181–82. 
 84. See  supra  notes  58–59  and  accompanying  text  (listing  courts  that  have  applied 
the co-conspirator theory of venue in securities cases). 
 85. Johnson, 650 F.3d at 715 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 
(1976)). 
 86. Id. at 716. 
 87. Id. at 714–16; Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188 (holding that a private plaintiff 
may not maintain an action for aiding and abetting under Exchange Act section 10(b)); see also 
Bankers Life  &  Cas.  Co.  v.  Holland,  346  U.S.  379,  384  (1953)  (rejecting  in  dictum  the  
use  of  the co-conspirator theory of venue in an antitrust case as “a frivolous albeit ingenious 
attempt to expand the statute”). 
 88. See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 168 (involving private plaintiffs bringing an 
action for aiding and abetting securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act); Bankers 
Life & Cas. Co., 346 U.S. at 380 (involving an action brought under federal antitrust laws). 
 89. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 168 (alleging a primary violation of section 10(b) 
against AmWest and secondary liability against Central Bank under section 10(b) for aiding and 
abetting).  In a private securities fraud action, a private investor brings suit against a corporation 
for personal damages resulting from securities fraud.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) (2006) 
(governing private securities litigation).  Conversely, in a public securities fraud action, the SEC 
brings an action on behalf of investors to enforce the securities laws as a part of its regulation of 
the securities system.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (authorizing the SEC to 
bring civil suit against violators of the securities laws); The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 36. 
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power,90 they are distinct from public actions, as evidenced by the PSLRA, 
which was specifically enacted to control private securities actions.91  
Accordingly, the interpretation and application of the securities laws in private 
actions should not influence public securities actions.92 
Second, Central Bank of Denver has been superseded, in its application to 
SEC actions, by the PSLRA.93  Given this express authority to sue individuals 
who aid and abet securities fraud, the SEC should be given leeway to bring 
such actions in the same venue in which the principal actors are sued.94  The 
SEC has relied on the co-conspirator theory of venue as a means of preventing 
fraud and enforcing its rules,95 and the specific grant of power to bring suit 
against individuals who come under secondary liability, such as aiding and 
abetting, justifies the use of the co-conspirator theory of venue to effectuate 
SEC authority.96 
2.  Bankers Life 
Bankers Life is distinguishable from Johnson because in Bankers Life, the 
Supreme Court was applying the co-conspirator theory under the special venue 
provision of antitrust law, not securities law.97  Despite similarities between 
                                                 
 90. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (“[I]mplied 
private actions provide ‘a most effective weapon in the enforcement’ of the securities laws and 
are ‘a necessary supplement to [SEC] action.’” (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 
(1964))). 
 91. See Private Sec. Litig. Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  Congress has expressly recognized that private 
securities actions are “an indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their 
losses without having to rely upon government action” and “promote public and global 
confidence in our capital markets and help[s] to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate 
officers,  auditors,  directors,  lawyers,  and  others  properly  perform  their  jobs.”  H.R. REP. 
NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731. 
 92. SEC v. Johnson, 650 F.3d 710, 714–15 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 956 
(2011). 
 93. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008) 
(recognizing that Congress specifically granted the SEC the power to prosecute aiders and 
abettors of securities fraud); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, § 
104, 109 Stat. 757 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006)); see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
654 F.3d 11, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (recognizing that Congress had enacted legislation allowing the 
SEC to pursue actions for aiding and abetting securities fraud, in response to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Central Bank of Denver). 
 94. See infra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (discussing the waste of resources when 
bringing similar actions against multiple defendants of the same fraud in different jurisdictions). 
 95. See Johnson, 650 F.3d at 714. 
 96. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Supp. IV 2010); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, 552 U.S. at 158. 
 97. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 380 (1953). The venue provision at 
issue in Bankers Life, a suit brought under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, was 15 U.S.C. § 15, 
which provides that suit may be brought “in any district court of the United States in the district 
in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 15) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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federal antitrust laws and federal securities laws, an antitrust case that rejects 
the use of the co-conspirator theory of venue should not, and does not, control 
the outcome of securities actions.98  The Supreme Court has specifically noted 
that “securities law and antitrust law are clearly incompatible” in certain 
instances.99  Further, Congress’s enactment of separate venue provisions for 
securities cases and antitrust cases demonstrates that, with respect to venue, 
Congress intended securities and antitrust cases to be distinct.100  Congress, 
recognizing the unique intricacies of securities law issues, expressly limited the 
procedural requirements for filing securities actions.101  Accordingly, the 
interpretation of venue in antitrust actions should not provide any basis for the 
interpretation of venue in securities actions.102 
B.  Co-Conspirator Theory is Consistent with 15 U.S.C. § 78aa 
Contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s analysis, the co-conspirator theory of venue is 
consistent with the language of 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.  As discussed above, venue 
under section 78aa is proper “in the district wherein any act or transaction 
constituting the violation occurred . . . or in the district wherein the defendant 
is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business . . . .”103  The disjunctive 
language used in the statute presupposes that the listed conditions are separate: 
venue is proper where the defendant resides or where any act occurred.104  
                                                 
 98. See BLUMBERG, supra note 28, at 201 (outlining and depicting the different standards 
applied in the venue statutes in (1) antitrust law; (2) patent law; (3) securities law; and (4) section 
1391, the general venue provision). 
 99. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279 (2007) (involving a 
complaint alleging violations of antitrust laws when they formed a business agreement that 
violated securities laws). 
 100. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa; see also Traband, supra note 30, at 247–50 (discussing the 
difference between the use of the co-conspirator theory of venue in securities fraud cases and its 
use in antitrust cases).  Discussing the Bankers Life opinion, commercial litigation attorney Rhett 
Traband states: 
The key difference between application of the co-conspiracy venue theory under the 
federal antitrust laws and under the federal securities laws is in the statutory basis of 
each group of laws.  The co-conspiracy venue theory had been used in cases alleging 
Clayton Act violations to satisfy the “transact[ion] of business” requirement.  Under the 
securities laws, the co-conspiracy venue theory has normally been applied to create 
venue where a co-conspirator acts within the forum district and does not merely 
transact business there. 
Id. at 250. 
 101. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 284. 
 102. See id. at 201 (asserting that for a venue determination, “orderly analysis requires 
statute-by-statute examination”). 
 103. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. 
 104. Id.; see Ravenwoods Inv. Co. v. Bishop Capital Corp., No. 04CV9266 KHK, 2005 WL 
236440, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2005) (advancing the presupposition that the listed conditions in 
sectio 78aa are separate conditions). 
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Additionally, despite the many changes to securities regulations by the 
PSLRA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Dodd-Frank Act,105 the language of 
§ 78aa has remained the same.106  The decision not to change the language of  
§ 78aa implies that Congress believed that venue would be easy to establish 
over defendants sued for aiding and abetting fraud.107  The application of the 
co-conspirator theory of venue is consistent with the spirit of the broad venue 
and service of process provisions in the Exchange Act that “evince an intent to 
gather complex securities litigation in a single forum.”108  In order to carry out 
its statutory purpose and function efficiently, the SEC should be able to sue 
multiple defendants to a securities fraud scheme in a single forum.109 
C.  Effects on SEC Enforcement Actions 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Johnson has potentially far-reaching effects 
on SEC enforcement actions.110  The SEC is headquartered in Washington, 
D.C., with eleven regional offices around the country.111  Most SEC civil 
enforcement actions are filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia because defendants usually file fraudulent documents at the SEC 
headquarters and it is often the only available venue when there are multiple 
defendants involved.112  Therefore, it can be inferred that the D.C. Circuit’s 
rejection of the co-conspirator theory is particularly troubling to the SEC. 
                                                 
 105. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also The Laws that Govern the Securities 
Industry, supra note 33, at 4 (identifying the changes made to U.S. Securities regulation). 
 106. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (demonstrating that since the passage of the PSLRA in 1995, 
§78aa has only been amended once, in 2010, with insignificant changes to its application). 
 107. See Traband, supra note 30, at 243–47 (describing the common law development of the 
co-conspirator theory of venue in aiding and abetting securities law actions and noting that 
courts’ interpretation of the broad purpose of 15 U.S.C. § 78aa indicated that there was little need 
to change the statute language to accommodate secondary liability suits). 
 108. Bolton v. Gramlich, 540 F. Supp. 822, 846 (S.D.N.Y 1982); see United States v. 
Johnson, 510 F.3d 521, 528 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that a clear purpose of the Exchange Act’s 
broad venue provision is “avoiding having related counts adjudicated in piecemeal fashion across 
several venues”); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 205 (5th Cir. 1960). 
 109. Motion for Rehearing of Appellee at 13–14, SEC v. Johnson, 650 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (No. 09-5399) (listing the reasons the SEC should be able to sue multiple defendants for 
securities fraud in one forum to avoid cumbersome, problematic, and duplicative cases); see also 
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 188–89 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (“Given the 
underlying policy of § 27 to confer venue in a wide variety of districts in order to ease the task of 
enforcement of federal securities law, it would be anomalous indeed if venue were not available 
in the Northern District of Texas in this case.”). 
 110. Motion for Rehearing, supra note 109, at 13 (“The effect of the panel opinion is 
potentially far-reaching and extremely damaging to the Commission.”). 
 111. SEC Organizational Chart, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/images/secorg.pdf (last visited October 20, 2012). 
 112. The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 36, at 2–3, 8. 
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A plaintiff carefully weighs many factors in choosing a forum in which to 
file a lawsuit.113  This choice of venue is important for many reasons, including 
favorable laws, courts, juries, convenience, and costs.114  In addition, statistics 
show that plaintiffs are successful in more than half of the cases when their 
choice of venue prevails.115  Given the complexity of securities fraud schemes 
in today’s global economy that involve “a wide spectrum of participants, 
contributing in various ways, from various location, at various stages,”116 
dismantling of the co-conspirator theory of venue will result in plaintiffs, 
including the SEC, bringing multiple actions in different forums for one 
scheme.117  This result is inefficient for both the plaintiff and the judicial 
system as it requires multiple courts to hear the same claims, using the same 
evidence, for a single fraudulent scheme.118 
Further, dismantling the co-conspirator theory of venue may disincentivize 
plaintiffs from suing potential defendants and decrease enforcement of 
securities laws.  The SEC protects investors by: (1) regulating the securities 
exchange markets and imposing filing requirements or standards on companies 
wishing to use the exchange markets;119 and (2) enforcing the securities 
regulations in administrative and judicial proceedings.120  The use of the  
co-conspirator theory of venue allows for judicial economy by decreasing 
repetitious lawsuits and increasing efficiency for the parties and the courts.121  
However, without the theory, a plaintiff or the SEC may be disinclined to file 
lawsuits against some potential defendants, entirely defeating the statutory 
                                                 
 113. Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 272 (1995). 
 114. Id. at 271 (stating that “[v]enue choices are often based on: the party’s geographical 
convenience; preference for judges in the chosen jurisdiction; preference for the substantive 
and/or procedural laws in a given venue; the belief that the potential jurors in a particular 
jurisdiction are more receptive to the filing party’s position; and comparisons between the trial 
calendars (and/or backlogs) in the various venues”). 
 115. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511–12 (1995) (“[T]he plaintiff wins in 58% of the nontransferred 
cases that go to judgment for one side or the other, but wins in only 29% of such cases in which a 
transfer occurred.”). 
 116. Motion for Rehearing, supra note 109, at 13. 
 117. Id. (emphasizing that if “every defendant in the case must act in the same forum for 
venue to lie . . . then the [SEC] would have to file suits involving overlapping facts in multiple 
districts, with all ‘the wastefulness of time, energy and money’ for the court system and 
litigants”). 
 118. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 119. The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 36. 
 120. Id. (articulating the enforcement functions of the SEC carried out by the commission’s 
division of enforcement). 
 121. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1318 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he 
inconvenience of requiring one defendant in a multi-defendant action to litigate in a distant forum 
is greatly outweighed by the interest of judicial economy and bringing together in one lawsuit, all 
related claims and alternative theories.”). 
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purpose and goals of securities enforcement laws.122  For these reasons, it is in 
the public interest to allow plaintiffs, or at a minimum, the SEC, to use the  
co-conspirator theory of venue to bring civil enforcement actions against all 
defendants party to one securities fraud scheme in one forum.123 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The D.C. Circuit in SEC v. Johnson erred in rejecting the co-conspirator 
theory of venue.  The co-conspirator theory of venue is consistent with the 
statutory purpose of the securities fraud venue provision and necessary to 
protect the public interest.  Just as Congress addressed the SEC’s authority to 
enforce aiding and abetting liability after Central Bank of Denver, Congress 
should amend the venue provisions to clarify that the co-conspirator theory of 
liability applies in such actions.  With no remedial action by Congress or the 
Supreme  Court,  the  D.C.  Circuit’s  decision  could  mean  the  end  of  the 
co-conspirator theory of venue in securities fraud actions.  Given the 
complexity of business transactions today, it is now more important than ever 
to maintain the protections enforced by the SEC and allow one suit to be 
brought against all perpetrators of a securities fraud scheme in one forum. 
 
                                                 
 122. See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 338 F. Supp 438, 440 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (adopting the  
co-conspirator theory of venue because, without it, the result would be “[a]n unnecessary 
multiplicity of suits and fragmenting of the issues involved”); see also United States v. Johnson, 
510 F.3d 521, 528 (4th Cir. 2007); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 205 (5th 
Cir. 1960); Motion for Rehearing, supra note 109, at 14 (discussing the negative impact of the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision on SEC enforcement actions and arguing that “[i]t might be necessary to 
forgo suit altogether against certain fraud participants based purely on their location or to skew 
the choice of forum for the entire case to a place inconvenient to all but one important wrongdoer.  
These consequences would flow not from statutory language, Supreme Court precedent, 
considered policy, or law enforcement judgment, but perversely from the way in which the 
mastermind of the fraud devised it and divided labor among those best situated to accomplish it”). 
 123. See Johnson, 510 F.3d at 528 (asserting that the abandonment of the co-conspirator 
theory of venue would be problematic for defendants and prosecutors, as well as other interested 
third parties, as it would require preparation for multiple trials). 
